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I. INTRODUCTION
Forsaking his previous employment with Sunbeam Breads, Tom Maddox
entered into a bakery business, Piedmont Bakeries ("Piedmont"), with John
Robbie and Rachel Foster in 1977, in Greenville, South Carolina.' Each
individual made an initial contribution of $15,000 cash to the capital buildup
of the company and personally guaranteed loans totalling an additional
$50,000. At the inception of the venture, the three organized Piedmont as a
partnership and entered into a partnership agreement. Each was to be actively
employed by the company, with Robbie acting as president and CEO, Foster
as secretary and CFO, and Maddox as manager of sales and marketing. Under
the agreement, profits were to be divided equally among the three partners.
In 1981 Piedmont was incorporated under South Carolina's Business
Corporations Act. 2 Robbie, Foster, and Maddox each received 300 shares of
common stock in Piedmont. They retained the same positions they had held
under the partnership and elected themselves to the company's three
directorships. The following year, in an effort to strengthen the company's
capital base, the three shareholders invited Roger Bowlen and Hope Jackson,
both former business associates of Robbie, to join Piedmont as shareholders.
In exchange for each newcomer's contribution of $95,000, the company issued
each of them 300 shares, thereby resulting in each Piedmont shareholder
possessing equal voting rights and an equal right to dividends. At the time
Bowlen and Jackson joined Piedmont, it was informally agreed that they would
be investors only, and would not participate in the company's management.
Despite the economic recession of the early 1980s, Piedmont fared quite
well, and by 1988, Robbie, Foster, and Maddox were each drawing approximately $40,000 as a base salary, $20,000 in director's fees, and an additional
$5000 in dividends annually. Bowlen and Jackson also received $5000 in
dividends annually. Unfortunately, differences in management philosophies
began to surface among the investors. As sales manager, Maddox had seen
first-hand the success the company experienced in the Asheville, North
Carolina area. He felt that Piedmont should concentrate on opening an
additional plant at that location to meet the demand for the company's
products. Maddox wanted to reinvest most of Piedmont's profits back into the
company in order to facilitate this expansion. The other shareholders,
however, content with the level of operations at Piedmont and not finding any
need for expansion, favored distributing profits among the shareholders.

1. The names and facts presented in this hypothetical are purely fictitious.
2. The Business Corporations Act is codified at Title 33 of the South Carolina Code.
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As a result of these differences, the shareholders voted to remove Maddox
from the board of directors in 1990, and Bowlen was elected to fill the
vacancy.' This move fueled further animosity among the parties, and the
working relationship between Maddox and the other two officers, Robbie and
Foster, started to deteriorate. In February of 1991, Robbie informed Maddox
that he was being terminated from his position with Piedmont.
Maddox consulted his attorney about his options for obtaining relief from
this treatment. He complained that the majority shareholders had essentially
squeezed him out of participating in the corporation. Maddox's attorney
contacted the other shareholders, complaining that Maddox was being
prevented from obtaining a fair return on his investment and that Maddox had
entered the venture with the expectation of sharing equally in the profits.
Robbie responded that Maddox would still receive his twenty percent of the
profits in the form of dividends. He further contended that Maddox could not
receive the same compensation he had been receiving because he no longer
worked for the company.
In 1991, 1992, and 1993, Maddox received only $1000 in dividends from
Piedmont. In the meantime, Piedmont's board of directors, consisting of
Robbie, Foster, and Bowlen, appointed Jackson manager of sales and
marketing. Maddox was not only disturbed by the reduction in dividends, but
also suspected that the board had increased the directors' fees and salaries and
that the others were absorbing most of the excess profits through that conduit.
Does the law afford any remedy to a minority shareholder in Maddox's
position? Maddox no longer receives a significant return from his twenty
percent interest in the company he helped start. He also lost his job, and as
a result, lost both his primary source of income and the primary source of
return on his investment. Nonetheless, Maddox was removed because
Piedmont's majority shareholders were concerned about his unwillingness to
support their plans for the future of Piedmont. In light of this fact, should the

3. Although Maddox had cumulative voting rights as provided by statute, see S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-7-280 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1994) (providing for cumulative voting unless the
articles of incorporation otherwise provide), he was unable to prevent his removal because there
were only three directorships but four shareholders voting in favor of removal.
Under the removal procedures outlined in the South Carolina statutes, when cumulative
voting is authorized a director may not be removed if the number of votes necessary to elect him
are voted against his removal; as a result, a director has the power to prevent his own removal
if he has sufficient votes to elect himself. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-108 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
In the present scenario, Maddox would not have had a sufficient number of votes to block
his removal. If the shareholders were electing directors, Robbie, Foster, Bowlen, and Jackson
would possess enough votes between them to fill the three directorships from among themselves.
Robbie, Foster, and Bowlen could cast their 900 votes for themselves, and Jackson could cast 300
votes for each of them. As a result, Robbie, Foster, and Bowlen would win the directorships
with 1200 votes each, while Maddox would come in fourth with the 900 votes he cast for
himself.
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company be sanctioned for a decision which, although seemingly unfair to a
minority shareholder, was arguably in the company's best interest?
Minority shareholders in Maddox's position often pursue remedies
afforded under their state's judicial dissolution statutes. These statutes permit
a shareholder to seek dissolution of the corporation, but most also permit
actions for alternative, less drastic remedies.
This Note explores the range of remedies available to a minority
shareholder under the South Carolina statutory scheme. Part II examines
judicial dissolution, focusing on the grounds for judicial dissolution and the
legal standard necessary to invoke this remedy. Part III analyzes the numerous
lesser remedies available to a minority shareholder, particularly a buyout of
the minority interest holder's shares. Because the valuation of a minority
interest can be a crucial determinant of the ultimate efficacy of a buyout
remedy, this valuation process is discussed in Part IV. Each of these parts
contains a summary and application section, allowing the reader to track Tom
Maddox's fortunes as the law is applied to this scenario.
II. JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION

A. Groundsfor JudicialDissolution
Section 33-14-300 of the South Carolina Code permits an oppressed
minority shareholder to bring an action for judicial dissolution. This section
provides:
The circuit courts may dissolve a corporation.. . (2) in a proceeding by
a shareholder if it is established that

. .

. (ii) the directors or those in

control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner
that is illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial either to the
corporation or to any shareholder (whether in his capacity as a shareholder, director, or officer of the corporation). 4
The Official Comments to this provision point out:
The application of these grounds for dissolution to specific circumstances
obviously involves judicial discretion in the application of a general
standard to concrete circumstances. The court should be cautious in the
application of these grounds so as to limit them to genuine abuse rather
than instances of acceptable tactics in a power struggle for control of a
corporation. 5

4. S.C.
5. S.C.

CODE ANN.
CODE ANN.

§ 33-14-300 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
§ 33-14-300 cmt. (2)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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B. "Oppression" Standard
Like that of most other states, South Carolina's judicial dissolution
provision is derived from the Model Business Corporations Act. To obtain
relief under the South Carolina statute, the complainant must show that the
majority shareholders acted in an "illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly
prejudicial" 6 manner. This standard is similar to that of the Model Act. By
including "oppressive" conduct as a ground for dissolution, the South Carolina
statute broadens the scope of actionable conduct by providing the frozen-out
minority shareholder a right of action based on conduct by the majority
shareholders which might not rise to the level of illegality or fraud.'
The Virginia Supreme Court, construing its judicial dissolution statute,
which is also based on the Model Act, has defined the term "oppressive" as
"conduct by corporate managers toward stockholders which departs from the
standards of fair dealing and violates the principles of fair play on which
persons who entrust their funds to a corporation are entitled to rely. "8 The
court stressed that "oppressive" is not merely a synonym for the other
statutory terms "illegal" and "fraudulent,"' thus reinforcing the notion that
"oppressive" has a separate and independently significant meaning.
Not all states have adopted the Model Act standard. The North Carolina
judicial dissolution statute, for instance, provides that dissolution may be
granted when it is "reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or
interests of the complaining shareholder." 0 The North Carolina legislature
adopted this standard because it ostensibly provides greater protection for
minority shareholders than the Model Act; however, there has been debate
over which standard is, in fact, more liberal because the word "oppressive"
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(ii) (Law. Co-op. 1990). There are, of course, other
grounds on which a shareholder can seek judicial dissolution, including when there is a deadlock
in the management of the corporation or the voting power of the shareholders; when corporate
assets are being misapplied or wasted; when the corporation has abandoned its business; and
when the corporation's period of duration has expired. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(i),
(iii)-(vi) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
7. It is noteworthy that the South Carolina statute adds to the Model Act by providing that
"unfairly prejudicial" conduct is also a ground for a shareholder action for dissolution. The
South Carolina Reporters' Comments to § 33-14-300(2)(ii) state that this section has broadened
the Model Act standard "to follow the formula used in Section 33-21-150(a)(4) of the 1981 South
Carolina Business Corporation Act. . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 reporters' cmt. (Law.
Co-op. 1990).
It is therefore arguable that the "unfairly prejudicial" standard gives more protection to the
minority shareholder than even the "oppressive" standard. Indeed, it almost appears that each
successive standard, i.e., illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial, is more generous
to the shareholder than the preceding one.
8. Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 730 (Va. 1990).
9. Id.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2)(ii) (1990).
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from the Model Act standard has been given such a broad reading in many
11
cases.
In Meiselman v. Meiselman'2 the North Carolina Supreme Court
determined that the "rights or interests" of a complaining shareholder, as set
forth in the North Carolina statute, include the "reasonable expectations" the
shareholder has in the corporation. The court continued:
These "reasonable expectations" are to be ascertained by examining the
entire history of the participants' relationship. That history will include
the "reasonable expectations" created at the inception of the participants'
relationship; those "reasonable expectations" as altered over time; and the
"reasonable expectations" which develop as the participants engage in a
course of dealing in conducting the affairs of the corporation. The
interests and views of the other participants must be considered in
determining "reasonable expectations." The key is "reasonable." In
order for plaintiff's expectations to be reasonable, they must be known to
or assumed by the other shareholders and concurred in by them. Privately
held expectations which are not made known to the other participants are
not "reasonable." Only expectations embodied in understandings, express
or implied, among the participants should be recognized by the court. 3
The court ultimately held that relief should be granted to a minority shareholder "'whenever corporate managers or controlling shareholders act in a way
that disappoints the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations, even
though the acts of the managers or controlling shareholders fall within the
literal scope of powers or rights granted them by the corporation act or the
corporation's charter or bylaws.'" 4 The court noted that the trial court had
erroneously focused on the conduct of the defendant rather than on the "rights
or interests" of the plaintiff, stating that it was error for the trial court to apply
such standards as "oppression" and "overreaching" to the defendant's
15
conduct.
Although the Meiselman court indicated that oppression by the majority
shareholder is an incorrect standard to use in an action for dissolution, courts
that have construed the oppressive conduct standard of the Model Act have
found that this standard, like the standard applied in Meiselman, also
implicates the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder. In In re

11. See RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW §
28.11, at 477 & n.5 (1990).

12. 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
13. Id. at 563.
14. Id. (quoting F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations:ExistingLegislation andRecommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 886 (1978)).
15. Id. at 566-67.
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Kemp & Beatley, Inc.16 the court stated that the reasonable expectations of
the complaining shareholder should be used "as a means of identifying and
measuring conduct alleged to be oppressive. " " The court in Landorf v.
Glottstein18 observed that the facts of that case, as alleged by the plaintiff,
amounted to a claim that the defendants had frustrated his reasonable
expectations of sharing in the profits and management of the corporation. The
court said that these allegations, if proven, might meet the standard of
oppressive conduct referred to in the statute.19 Likewise, in Brenner v.
Berkowitz2 the court recognized that "[o]ppression has been defined as
frustrating a shareholder's reasonable expectations."2
South Carolina courts have yet to address the significance of the
shareholder's reasonable expectations in the context of an action for judicial
dissolution. In fact, no real working definition has been developed to help the
courts apply the oppressive conduct standard. Rather, the courts appear to
operate on a case-by-case basis, determining whether the conduct complained
of is sufficiently egregious and unfair to warrant relief or whether the conduct
is justified in light of some legitimate corporate objective. The cases which
follow illustrate this approach.
C. What Conduct Constitutes Oppression?
Cases in which courts have found oppressive conduct on the part of
majority shareholders frequently involve similar factual circumstances.
Typically, the complaining shareholder will claim that she has been "frozen
out" or "squeezed out" by the majority, which often means that the shareholder's employment with the company has been terminated, compensation (in the
form of salary or dividends) has been cut off, and the shareholder generally
has been excluded from participating in the management of the company.
1. In South Carolina
Several South Carolina cases have addressed the question of what conduct
is sufficiently oppressive to warrant dissolution, a forced buyout, or other
relief. In an early case, Towles v. South Carolina Produce Ass'n,l the
plaintiffs brought an action seeking dissolution of a corporation in which they

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 1179.
500 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1986), aft'd, 511 N.Y.S.2d 776 (App. Div. 1987).
Id. at 496-97.
634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993).
Id. at 1028.
187 S.C. 290, 197 S.E. 305 (1938).
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owned a minority interest. The plaintiffs sought relief under a dissolution
statuteP on the ground that the corporation had not paid dividends for a
period of three years. The court found that dividends had not been paid
because the majority stockholders were attempting to rehabilitate the
corporation from a weak financial position.24 The court thus concluded that
dissolution was inappropriate. In support of its holding, the court stated:
While this statute was undoubtedly intended to afford minority stockholders
a method of relief against mismanagement of a corporation by majority
stockholders, or the suspension of dividends for the purpose of freezing
out minority stockholders, or depressing the market value of the stock of
the corporation, it was never intended that the mere fact that a corporation
could not pay a dividend for three years, time to be computed from three
years after it has begun business, would ipso facto entitle minority
stockholders to have such corporation dissolved, and a Receiver appointed
therefor.25
In a more recent case, Segall v. Shore,26 the court found that the conduct
of two controlling shareholders had been sufficiently oppressive to justify a
forced buyout. Concerning the conduct of these defendants, the master found
that they had misappropriated over $1,000,000 of the profits from one of the
corporations, they had continued this course of action even after the supreme
court (in an earlier opinion) had directed them to "restore profits and to
account," and they had even withdrawn an additional $175,000 from the
corporation to pay their income taxes.27 The court found that the master's
conclusions that the defendants had acted oppressively and unfairly were
supported by the record, and thus, the court held that a redemption of the
plaintiffs' shares pursuant to the dissolution statute was appropriate.28
Two recent oppression cases have involved claims by minority shareholders that certain corporate actions diluted their interests in the corporations. In
Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co.,29 the plaintiff, a minority shareholder,
alleged that a share exchange plan between the corporation and the majority
shareholder, which was also a corporation, had reduced his ownership in the
23. S.C. CODE § 7725 (1932). This section granted stockholders owning one-fifth or more
of a corporation's stock the right to seek dissolution of the corporation if the corporation had not
paid dividends over a three-year period.
24. Towles, 187 S.C. at 295-97, 197 S.E. at 307-08.
25. Id. at 295, 197 S.E. at 307.
26. 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
27. Id. at 36, 236 S.E.2d at 318.
28. Id. at 37, 236 S.E.2d at 318. The controlling statute was S.C. CODE § 12-22.15 (Supp.
1975), which is comparable to the current dissolution statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300
(Law. Co-op. 1990).
29. 305 S.C. 358, 409 S.E.2d 340 (1991).
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first corporation from 33 1/3% to 11.5% 3o The court held that the plaintiff
was not entitled to pursue an action for dissenter's rights because he held an
interest in the acquiring corporation, and the statute only permitted a
shareholder in the acquired corporation to seek dissenter's rights. 31 However, the court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the claim he
asserted pursuant to the judicial dissolution statute, section 33-14-310, and that
the plaintiff could properly request a buyout directly under the statute, rather
than asking for dissolution.32 The court thus affirmed the denial of the
defendants' motion to dismiss the claim.33
A second oppression case involving allegations that the minority
34
shareholders' interests were diluted is Roper v. Dynamique Concepts, Inc.
In that case, a corporation had been organized "to develop and market a
revolutionary type of pump" which had been invented by one of the shareholders. 35 The corporation met with financial difficulties, and as a result, the
controlling shareholders voted to issue a substantial number of additional
shares to raise capital for the corporation. The issuance of additional shares
afforded the minority shareholders preemptive rights, which they, however,
failed to exercise. Subsequently, the minority shareholders brought an action
seeking dissolution, alleging that the majority shareholders had acted in a
manner intended to dilute the minority shareholders' interest in the corporation
and to squeeze them out. 35 The court found, however, that "the record
clearly reflects [that the corporation] was in serious financial trouble, and the
"3
additional stock issue was a last ditch effort to save the corporation.
Thus, the court found that the majority shareholders had acted in good faith
in voting to issue additional stock and upheld the trial judge's denial of judicial
dissolution.3" As in Towles, the court indicated that a good faith justification
for certain corporate actions will overcome a claim of oppression by
dissatisfied minority shareholders.39

30. Id. at 361, 409 S.E.2d at 342.
31. Id. at 362-63, 409 S.E.2d at 342-43. The dissenter's rights statute that the court construed
was S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102(2) (Law. Co-op. 1990). This statute would allow a
shareholder who dissents to certain corporate actions to sell her shares back to the corporation.
32. Id. at 363-64, 409 S.E.2d at 343-44.
33. Id. at 364, 409 S.E.2d at 344.
34. _ S.C. _, 447 S.E.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1994).
35. Id. at
447 S.E.2d at 220.
36. Id. at
447 S.E.2d at 221-22.
37. Id. at
, 447 S.E.2d at 226.
38. Id. at __, 447 S.E.2d at 226.
39. Roper, _ S.C. at __, 447 S.E.2d at 226; see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Towles.
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2. In Other Jurisdictions
Several cases from other states give further insight into conduct that
constitutes oppression by majority shareholders.
In Meiselman v.
Meiselman,4° for example, the plaintiff argued that a mandatory buyout was
necessary to protect his "rights or interests" in the corporation because he had
been fired, his fringe benefits had been terminated, and he had been denied
participation in management decisions of the company. The defendants
contended that the plaintiff was entitled to relief only if his traditional rights
as a shareholder had been infringed, such as the right to notice of shareholders' meetings, the right to compel payment of dividends, and so on. The court
disagreed with the defendants and held that the plaintiff's reasonable
expectations were not limited to these traditional rights."a The court
ultimately remanded the case for a determination of what reasonable
42
expectations the plaintiff held and whether he was entitled to relief.
In Balvik v. Sylvester 43 the court found that the defendant majority
shareholder had engaged in oppressive conduct. The plaintiff had quit his
former employment to join with the defendant in an electrical contracting
business. The plaintiff made a substantial investment in the business and
relied on his involvement with the business as his primary source of income.
Disputes eventually arose between the plaintiff and the defendant regarding
their differing business philosophies. As a result, the plaintiff was fired and
thereby lost his primary means of obtaining a return on his investment. He
was later removed as a director and officer of the corporation. The court
found that the plaintiff had received nothing from the corporation since his
removal and that "the possibility of a declaration of dividends in the near
future appears remote" because the defendant had apparently decided to
reinvest profits into the corporation.'
In explaining the means by which
minority shareholders are sometimes "frozen out," the court stated:
"A variety of freeze-out techniques exist, with the withholding of
dividends being by far the most commonly applied technique. This
technique is often combined with the discharge of the minority shareholder
from employment and removal of the minority shareholder from the board
of directors. If the minority shareholder is employed by the corporation
full time, as is typical, and if she relies on her salary as her primary means
of obtaining a return on her investment, as is typical, she is suddenly left
with little or no income and little or no return on her investment. The

40. 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
41. Id. at 564-65.
42. Id. at 567.

43. 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
44. Id. at 384-88.
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controlling shareholders may effectively deprive the minority shareholder
of every economic benefit that she derives from the corporation.'"a
The court concluded that the plaintiff clearly had been frozen out and was
46
entitled to relief.
Denying minority shareholders a return on their investment was found to
constitute oppressive conduct in In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc. 47 In that case
the plaintiffs, two minority shareholders, ended their long-term employment
with the corporation. During the time they had been employed, the company
had a policy of awarding de facto dividends, based on stock ownership, in the
form of "extra compensation bonuses." 4'
After the plaintiffs left the
corporation's employ, the policy was changed so that the "extra compensation" was awarded on the basis of services rendered to the corporation. In
affirming the lower court, the New York Court of Appeals held that "[ilt was
not unreasonable for the fact finder to have determined that this change in
policy amounted to nothing less than an attempt to exclude petitioners from
gaining any return on their investment through the mere recharacterization of
distributions of corporate income. "49
In another dissolution action brought by minority shareholders, Giannotti
v. Hamway,5° the court found that certain conduct on the part of the majority
shareholders, including the failure to pay adequate dividends, was oppressive.
On the issue of dividends, the plaintiffs showed that over ten years the
defendants' compensation (including salaries and director's fees) totalled
almost $2.8 million, while the plaintiffs had received only $50,000 in common
stock dividends."1 The plaintiffs also alleged that the compensation received
by the majority shareholders was excessive in light of their services performed
and that the majority had engaged in certain improper transactions. The court
determined that the evidence supported the chancellor's findings that the
defendants had been guilty of oppressive conduct which had "'effectively
[frozen] out plaintiffs from a reasonable opportunity to receive a reasonable
52
return on their investment."

45. 1d. at 387 (quoting D. Charles MacDonald, Corporate Behavior and the Minority
Shareholder: ContrastingInterpretationsof Section 10-19.1-115 of the North Dakota Century
Code, 62 N.D. L. REv. 155, 164-65 (1986)).
46. Id. at 388.
47. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
48. Id. at 1180.
49. Id.
50. 387 S.E.2d 725 (Va. 1990).
51. 1d. at 729, 732.
52. Id. at 730 (quoting from the findings of the chancellor below).
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D. Summary and Application
Due to a difference in business philosophies, the majority shareholders of
Piedmont Bakeries have frozen Tom Maddox out of the company by removing
him from the board of directors and terminating his employment. Instead of
the salary, director's fees, and dividends Maddox used to receive for his
involvement with Piedmont, he now receives only dividends, and the amount
of these dividends has been reduced. In light of these facts, has Maddox been
oppressed in such a manner that he is entitled to relief?.
Where is the proper balance between the competing interests of the
minority shareholder and the corporation under the standard set forth in
section 33-14-300? In some cases oppression is obvious. For example, Segall
v. Shore 3 presents an easy case; when controlling shareholders misappropriate corporate assets, the court will find no difficulty in awarding relief.
Indeed, such conduct is illegal and fraudulent, as well as oppressive.
However, many cases present a much more difficult question. When persons
in control of a corporation act within their legal rights in the corporate
structure and for legitimate purposes, it is more difficult to characterize their
conduct as oppressive even if it appears to be unfair to the minority shareholder.
As described earlier, one approach courts have taken in defining
oppression has been to focus on the reasonable expectations of the minority
shareholder.54 The conduct of the controlling shareholders is considered
oppressive when it frustrates these reasonable expectations. This approach
implicates notions of equity in that it potentially gives greater weight to the
expectations of the shareholder than to the legitimate business objectives of the
corporation.
Under the reasonable expectations analysis, the conduct of Piedmont's
majority shareholders likely would be considered oppressive. Maddox entered
the business with Robbie and Foster with the understanding that each would
be employed by the company and would share equally in the company's
profits. Maddox's expectations of employment and a proportionate share of
the profits were not altered when Bowlen and Jackson joined the corporation.
Moreover, Maddox's expectations were known to Robbie and Foster because
they had essentially the same expectations.
The North Carolina Supreme Court expounded on the reasonable
5 by stating that the court should focus
expectations approach in Meiselman"
on the interests of the plaintiff rather than the conduct of the defendants.
Under this rule, if Maddox's expectations were in fact reasonable, he probably

53. 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
54. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
55. Id.
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would be entitled to relief even if the majority shareholders had removed him
because of genuine differences in business philosophies. This emphasis on the
minority shareholder's position tips the balance in favor of the shareholder
in
close cases.
A second approach courts have taken in defining oppression is to hold that
oppression means denying the shareholder a reasonable return on his
investment. 56 This approach may tie in with the shareholder's reasonable
expectations because what kind of return is considered reasonable may depend
on what the shareholder expected from his investment.
This analysis was used in Balvik v. Sylvester," a case in which the
plaintiff found himself in a position similar to Maddox's. The plaintiff had
quit his former job to start a business with the defendant, but he was later
fired by the defendant. The court held that because the plaintiff had lost his
salary and also was not receiving dividends from the corporation, he had been
denied a return on his investment and was thus entitled to relief.5" Similarly,
because Maddox started out with such a large stake in Piedmont, a court might
find that the nominal dividends Maddox is now receiving do not constitute a
reasonable return.
These two theories of oppression, though protective of minority
shareholder interests, certainly will not help the shareholder whose presence
is affirmatively damaging to the corporation. If the minority shareholder were
incompetent or unethical in performing his responsibilities within the company,
the court would not find that his removal from the company was oppressive.
Perhaps an incompetent or unethical shareholder should not reasonably expect
that his tenure with the company would continue.
The South Carolina courts have not addressed the notions of reasonable
expectations or reasonable investment return as a basis for defining oppression.
However, the cases do indicate that oppression will not be found when the
controlling shareholders have acted in good faith. In Roper v. Dynamique
Concepts, Inc. ,9 for example, the court of appeals held that the issuance of
additional shares, although diluting the interests of the minority shareholders,
did not constitute oppression because it was done as a good faith attempt to
raise capital for the corporation. Defining oppression as the failure to act in
good faith would provide greater protection for the corporation's legitimate
business decisions. Even if a corporate decision were contrary to the
reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder, such action would not be
considered oppressive so long as the decision was made in good faith.

56.
57.
58.
59.

See, e.g., Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 387-88.
_ S.C. _, 447 S.E.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1994).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1995

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 15
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:195

Thus, because a difference in business philosophy is probably a good faith
(albeit not very strong) reason for removing Maddox from the management of
Piedmont, under the good faith analysis this reason would outweigh any
countervailing expectations Maddox might have. On the other hand, if
Maddox had been removed merely because Robbie wanted to clear a position
on the board for his son who had recently graduated from college, this would
not constitute a good faith business decision. Under this analysis, the
motivations behind the corporate actions, rather than the interests of the
minority shareholder, are of paramount importance. Consequently, the
balance is more likely to lean in favor of the corporation than it would under
the reasonable expectations analysis.

III. AVAILABILITY OF BUYOUT AND
OTHER ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

A. In South Carolina
1. Chapter 14, Business CorporationAct
Under the South Carolina Business Corporations Act of 1988,1 an
oppressed minority shareholder has alternative remedies available in addition
to dissolution. Indeed, most courts recognize that dissolution is a drastic
remedy and that other, less severe remedies are appropriate in certain cases. 6
Section 33-14-310(d) of the South Carolina Code sets forth four less drastic
remedies which the court, in its discretion, may order as alternatives to
dissolution. These remedies include (1) altering the articles of incorporation
or bylaws, (2) altering any corporate act or resolution, (3) directing or
prohibiting any act of the shareholders, directors, officers or other parties, and
(4) ordering a purchase at fair value of the shares of any shareholder.62 The
section provides that the list of remedies is merely representative and that the
court retains authority to order any other appropriate relief not specifically
listed. Subsection (e) provides that "the relief authorized in subsection (d)
may be granted as an alternative to a decree of dissolution or may be granted
whenever the circumstances of the case are such that the relief, but not
dissolution, is appropriate. " 63 Thus, under the South Carolina statute,
alternative relief may be granted regardless of whether the oppression by the
60. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-101 to 33-20-105 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1994).
61. See, e.g., Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985) (ordering a buy-out of
oppressed minority shareholder's interest); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D.
1987) (upholding trial court's finding of oppressive conduct, but reversing order of dissolution).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d)(1)-(4) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(e) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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majority shareholders is sufficiently egregious to warrant dissolution.'
Moreover, several South Carolina cases point out that the judicial dissolution
statute does not limit a plaintiff to seeking dissolution, but rather permits the
plaintiff to request directly any alternative form of relief.'
The South Carolina statute thus affords the court great flexibility in
fashioning remedies for an oppressed shareholder. The South Carolina
Reporters' Comments to section 33-14-310 point out that subsections (d) and
(e) were added to the standard Model Act provisions in order to "continue the
explicit statement of the court's inherent equitable powers found in Section 3321-155 of the 1981 South Carolina Business Corporation Act. The net effect
of these changes is that the new provision is quite similar to prior South
Carolina law."'
2. Chapter18, Business CorporationsAct
(Statutory Close Corporation Supplement)
As with the Business Corporations Act, the South Carolina Statutory
Close Corporation Supplement67 also provides an oppressed shareholder a
right of action to seek dissolution or some other remedy.68 In practice, these
procedures for judicial dissolution operate in a similar manner;69 however,
the framework of the judicial dissolution provisions under the Statutory Close
Corporation Supplement is more effective in expressing the policies which
underlie the statute.
Section 33-18-400(a) provides:

64. Compare the South Carolina provision with the parallel section of the North Carolina
General Statutes. In North Carolina, if the court first finds that dissolutionwould be appropriate
in a particular case, the corporation is then permitted to elect between dissolution and a buyout
of the plaintiff's shares. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-31(d) (1990). The present version of the
North Carolina statute differs from the South Carolina version by "(a) requiring, instead ofjust
permitting, the court to give the corporation an alternative to involuntary dissolution, (b) limiting
the alternative to a mandatory buyout at fair value, and (c) requiring a level of proof sufficient

to justify involuntary dissolution."

RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA
CORPORATION LAw § 28.12, at 481 (1990). Under the South Carolina statute, the court is less

restricted in determining the appropriate relief for an oppressed minority shareholder.
65. See Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1324 (D.S.C. 1987) (stating that the dissolution
statute is jurisdictional and that "asking for dissolution is merely a prerequisite to obtaining other
forms of relief under [the statute]"); Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co., 305 S.C. 358, 364, 409
S.E.2d 340, 343-44 (1991) (holding that a shareholderalleging a legitimate ground for dissolution
'need not demand dissolution but may seek the alternative relief available under [the statute]").
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310 reporters' cmts. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-101 to -500 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-400 to -430 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
69. In fact, one of the grounds for judicial dissolution under the South Carolina Statutory
Close Corporation Supplement is that grounds exist for judicial dissolution under the Business
Corporations Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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Subject to satisfying the conditions of subsections (c) and (d), a shareholder of a statutory close corporation may petition the circuit court for any of
the relief described in sections 33-18-410, 33-18-420, or 33-18-430 if: the
directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or
will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly
prejudicial to the petitioner, whether in his capacity as shareholder,
director, or officer of the corporation. 70
The Supplement establishes a "tiering" of the remedies provided in sections
33-18-410, -420, and -430, ranking the available remedies according to a
preference for less drastic remedies. Section 33-18-410(a) grants the court the
authority to order one or more types of "ordinary relief" if it finds that a
ground for relief is present. The section lists nine types of relief available to
the court, including an alteration of the articles of incorporation or bylaws,
removal of any officer or director, appointment of a provisional director, an
order to compel payment of dividends, and other forms of relief. 71 According to the Official Comment, the purpose of listing the relief available is "to
overcome the reluctance some courts have shown in the past to ordering
anything other than dissolution, or possibly a buy-out."72 Section 33-18-410
does not provide whether or not the enumerated forms of relief are exclusive.
Presumably, because of the policy in South Carolina of recognizing the courts'
"inherent equitable powers" to fashion alternative remedies, a court in this
state would not be limited to the types of relief listed in this section. 73
Section 33-18-420, entitled "Extraordinary relief: share purchase," states
that if the court finds the ordinary relief afforded under section 33-18-410 to
be inappropriate in resolving the dispute, the court may order dissolution
"unless the corporation or one or more of its shareholders purchase all the
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990). The conditions set forth in
subsections (c) and (d) provide, respectively, that the shareholder must first pursue any
nonjudicial remedies (i.e., arbitration) to which she has agreed in writing, and that the
shareholder must file the action before the time required to give notice of intent to demand
payment if she is entitled to dissenter's rights. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-400(c)-(d) (Law. Coop. 1990). The latter condition is designed to prevent a shareholder who has foregone her
dissenter's rights from being able to block the proposed transaction using this section. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-18-400 cmt. (3) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-410(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-410 cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
73. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d)-(e) & reporters' cmts. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
Subsections (d) and (e) of § 33-14-310 state that a court may order any appropriate relief as an
alternative to judicial dissolution. These subsections were added to the Model Act provision to
make clear the court's equitable power to order remedies outside the statute. See id. reporters'
cmts. However, § 33-18-410 has not been altered significantly from the language of the Model
Act. Thus, although the Model Act itself does not address in either section the question of
whether the statutory remedies are exclusive, because the General Assembly altered § 33-14-310,
it is reasonable to assume the same flexibility should apply when operating under § 33-18-410.
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shares of the shareholder for their fair value and on terms determined under
subsection (b)."" Subsection (b) grants the court power to establish the
terms of the share purchase, including the authority to determine the fair value
of the shares by considering factors such as the corporation's going concern
value, the terms of any shareholders' agreements, or recommendations of
court-appointed appraisers.75
Section 33-18-430, "Extraordinary relief: dissolution," provides that the
court may order dissolution if it finds grounds for judicial dissolution and that
any other relief ordered by the court under sections 33-18-410 and -420 has
proven ineffective to resolve the dispute.76 Thus, the framework developed
by sections 33-18-400 through -430 encourages the court to consider first the
"ordinary relief" described in section 33-18-410. If these remedies prove
inadequate, the court may move on to consider a mandatory buyout and then
dissolution; the statute makes clear that dissolution is the least favored remedy
and should be ordered only after all other available remedies have been
considered and rejected. The South Carolina Reporters' Comments indicate
that "[t]his tiering of remedies is consistent with existing case law under...
the 1981 South Carolina Business Corporation Act. " " The Statutory Close
Corporation Supplement thus makes explicit an order of preference that also
exists under the judicial dissolution provisions of Chapter 14.
3. Chapter 43, Limited Liability Company Act
The judicial dissolution provision under the newly enacted South Carolina
Limited Liability Company Act78 does not follow the approach to judicial
dissolution established under Chapters 14 and 18. Section 33-43-902,
"Judicial dissolution," provides that "on application by or for a member, the
court of common pleas in the county of the principal place of business may
decree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business of the limited liability company. ""
Limited liability company statutes generally do not incorporate the
dissolution provisions set forth in the business corporations statutes because

74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-420(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-420(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990). The Official Comment adds that
"Fair value is to be determined under principles developed in dissenters' rights and other
valuation cases." The South Carolina Reporters' Comments state that "going concern value" was
included as a factor for determining fair value to ensure that courts would not use liquidation
value. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-420 cmt. & reporters' cmt. (2) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18430(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18400 reporters' cmts. (1), (2) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
78. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994) (enacted June 16,
1994).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-902 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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limited liability companies (LLCs) are based primarily on a partnership model.
LLC statutes in most jurisdictions provide that members may withdraw and
receive the value of their percentage interest in the investment; moreover,
withdrawal of a member typically results in dissolution of the LLC unless the
members agree to the contrary. These provisions afford the members greater
liquidity in their investment and permit the LLC to be characterized as a
partnership for tax purposes.8"
LLCs are similar to closely held corporations in that both organizational
structures typically place restrictions on the transferability of an investor's
interest. Under most LLC statutes, however, members have an automatic
right to leave the LLC and to receive compensation for their interest. This
scenario obviates the need for the protections afforded by the judicial
dissolution provisions that apply to closely held corporations and would
explain the seemingly simplistic form of the LLC judicial dissolution
provisions. Ribstein and Keatinge, two leading commentators on the subject
of LLCs, suggest that corporate judicial dissolution cases should not carry
much precedential weight when a court is asked to apply the LLC provisions
because judicial dissolution serves a different purpose in the context of LLCs:
In a close corporation, [judicial dissolution] may fill a gap in the parties'
agreement that exists because the parties simply neglected to anticipate
difficulties down the road. In LLCs, on the other hand, judicial dissolution is significant only where the agreement affirmatively limits the parties'
statutory default right to dissolve at will by withdrawing. Accordingly,
judicial dissolution ordinarily will not merely fill gaps in the agreement,
but may override its express provisions. Thus, judicial dissolution should
be employed much more cautiously in LLCs than in close corporations. 8'
South Carolina's LLC Act has been somewhat modified from the standard
model. This modification may necessitate future changes in the LLC judicial
dissolution provision. Section 33-43-802(A)(1) of the LLC Act provides that
when a "member withdraws by voluntary act from the limited liability
company," this constitutes an event of dissociation;' section 33-43-901(C)
provides that the LLC dissolves upon "an event of dissociation of a member,"
unless a "majority in interest of the remaining members" agree within ninety
days to continue the LLC and at least two members remain. 3

80. LARRY E. RmsmiN

&

ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED

LIABILITY COMPANIES § 11.01, at 11-2 (1992).

81. Id. § 11.15, at 11-45 (citation omitted).
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-802(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). Section 33-43-802 sets
forth numerous other events of dissociation, including a member's removal, bankruptcy, or death.
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-901(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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Section 33-43-602 sets forth the dissociating member's right to receive
compensation for her interest. It provides that if the member dissociation does
not result in winding up, the member is entitled to receive any distribution to
which she was entitled prior to the dissociation as well as any amount provided
by the operating agreement. 4 If the operating agreement does not provide
for the amount of such distribution, the member is entitled to the fair value of
her interest in the LLC as determined from the date of dissociation.' The
section thus presents an impediment to the member receiving the value of her
interest in that the member's right to compensation may be limited by the
operating agreement.
A further problem for the dissociating LLC member is that if the member
"wrongfully dissociates," as explained in section 33-43-803, she is liable to the
LLC for damages caused by the dissociation. Sections 33-43-803(B) and 3343-602(C) provide that these damages must be offset against the buyout price
to which the dissociating member would otherwise be entitled. Section 33-43803(A)(2) provides that a voluntary withdrawal under section 33-43-802(A)(1),
cited above, is wrongful unless the withdrawal "follows the dissociation of
another member which results in a dissolution" or "is permitted by a written
provision of the operating agreement."86 Thus, in many circumstances
members who elect to withdraw from an LLC may be liable for damages
which could reduce the net compensation from their buyout.
Because of the potential difficulties LLC members may face in attempting
to leave the LLC and receive compensation for their interests, courts will
undoubtedly find the need to resort to the judicial dissolution provision found
in section 33-43-902. Consequently, this section should be developed further
to explain the circumstances in which dissolution or a court-ordered buyout
would be appropriate. The current standard for dissolution, "not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business of the [LLC],"11 is certainly broad
enough to permit courts to follow the principles established in the corporate
judicial dissolution statutes if they should choose to do so; however, it is
inadequate insofar as it fails to provide a reasoned method for determining
when judicial intervention is appropriate.

84.
85.
86.
87.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-602(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-803(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-902 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
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B. In Other Jurisdictions
Many states' corporate dissolution statutes do not expressly provide for
any remedies other than dissolution. In most of these states, however, the
courts have found equitable power to fashion remedies not expressly created
by statute. For example, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that the
remedies available to an oppressed minority shareholder are not limited to the
statutory remedy of dissolution. In Balvik v. Sylvester 88 the defendant
corporation fired the plaintiff and removed him from the board of directors.
The plaintiff brought an action seeking dissolution of the corporation or a
court-ordered buyout of his shares. The plaintiff alleged that the majority
shareholder had breached a fiduciary duty and that he had engaged in
oppressive conduct.8 9 The court upheld the trial court's finding of oppression
but reversed its decision to dissolve the corporation.' The court noted that
dissolution is a drastic remedy that should only be granted with caution. The
controlling statute only specified dissolution as the remedy available to an
oppressed minority shareholder. The court found, however, that the statute
allowed alternative equitable remedies that were not specifically mentioned,
and then listed ten possible alternatives, including a mandatory buyout. 9'
The court held that the trial court had erred by ordering dissolution which, in
this case, was an unduly harsh remedy. Because the plaintiff, in his
complaint, sought a buyout as an alternative remedy, the court held that a
buyout was appropriate and remanded the case for a determination of the value
of the plaintiffs shares.'
In Stefano v. Coppoc93 the lower court found that the defendants,
controlling shareholder-directors in a close corporation, had engaged in
oppressive conduct. Although the lower court awarded a buyout to the
minority shareholder, the defendants argued on appeal that dissolution was the
only available remedy because it was the only remedy mentioned in the
statute.'
The Alaska Supreme Court responded that the involuntary

88. 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
89. Id. at 384-85.
90. Id. at 388, 389.
91. Id. at 388-89. Other possible remedies which the court suggested might be appropriate
in certain situations included an order for dissolution at a future date that would become effective
only if the parties did not reach a resolution, the appointment of a receiver, an order for an
accounting, the issuance of an injunction, an order for a declaration of dividends, and an award
of damages. Id. (citing Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (Or.
1973)).
92. Id. at 389.
93. 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985).
94. Id. at 445 n.2. The Alaska statute used the term "liquidation" instead of dissolution. Id.
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dissolution statute was remedial in nature95 and that "courts retain equitable
authority to fashion a less drastic remedy [than dissolution] to fit the parties'
situation." 9" The court held that the buyout remedy was appropriate under
the facts of the case, despite the majority shareholders' contention that a
buyout was actually a more drastic remedy than dissolution because it was
more costly to them.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court construed its state corporate dissolution
statute in Brenner v. Berkowitz.98 The statute provided for a court-ordered
buyout as an alternative to dissolution. A buyout order could occur, however,
only upon a motion by the prospective purchaser and after a determination by
the court that a buyout would be fair to all involved. The court thus
concluded that the language of the statute only specifically authorized
voluntary purchases by a shareholder or by the corporation. 9 Nevertheless,
the court determined that the statute did not displace the court's equitable
powers, and added that it would be illogical for the court to possess the power
to order dissolution but not the lesser power to order a mandatory buyout:
"Accordingly, although the statute authorizes only voluntary purchases of
stock, we are persuaded that in appropriate circumstances a court exercising
its equitable powers, as an alternative to dissolution, could compel the
purchase of a shareholder's stock by the corporation . . . . "
The court
noted, however, that caution should be exercised in ordering a mandatory
buyout and that the remedy should be reserved primarily for instances in
which dissolution is the only alternative.' 0'
In contrast to the opinions discussed above, some courts have held that a
complaining minority shareholder is limited to the remedies expressly provided
in the dissolution statute. In Jordon v. Bowman Apple Products Co."° the
plaintiff shareholder brought an action for common law oppression and sought
a mandatory buyout of her shares. The defendants claimed, however, that the
relevant statute limited the plaintiff's remedies to dissolution. The federal
district court, after examining several state court opinions, concluded that the
statute "supersedes the common law right of action for oppression and limits
a plaintiff's remedies to those available under the statute, namely dissolution
or the appointment of a custodian." 0 3 The plaintiff also argued that, despite
the language of the statute, the court still maintained equitable jurisdiction to

95. Id.
96. Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
97. id.
98. 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993).
99. Id. at 1031.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 728 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1990) (mem.).
103. Id. at 415.
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grant the relief she sought. The court rejected this argument and found that
it was precluded from taking equitable jurisdiction because the plaintiff had a
"full, complete and adequate remedy at law" under the statute."°4 In
Giannotti v. Hamway 5 the Supreme Court of Virginia, interpreting the
same statute, stated that "[tihe remedy specified by the legislature, while
discretionary, is 'exclusive,' and does not permit the trial court to fashion
other, apparently equitable remedies. " 106 Despite these cases, the Virginia
courts appear to be in the minority on this issue.1w
C. Summary and Application
Assuming a court would find that Piedmont's majority shareholders had
acted oppressively, the court might be more likely to award Maddox a buyout
of his interest rather than order a complete dissolution of the company.
Dissolution is considered a drastic remedy and is typically reserved for only
the most extreme circumstances. South Carolina Code section 33-14-310(d)
authorizes the court to award several alternative, less drastic remedies,
including a court-ordered buyout, if the circumstances justify it.'
Section
33-18-420 permits the court to award a buyout to a shareholder in a statutory
close corporation. Under both statutes, the buyout remedy, though not applied

104. Id. at 416.
105. 387 S.E.2d 725 (Va. 1990).
106. Id. at 733 (citing White v. Perkins, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (Va. 1972)).
107. Virginia and Minnesota appear to be the only states which have held that the statutory
remedies are exclusive. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for
Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW. 699, 722-23 (1993). The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Sundberg
v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), held that the buyout remedy,
which was provided by statute only in the close corporation setting, would not be applied in other
settings because to do so would make the statute superfluous. Sundberg, 390 N.W.2d at 356;
see also Robert S. McLean, Survey, Minority Shareholders' Rights in the Close Corporation
Under the New North CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1109, 1120 (1990)
(arguing that North Carolina's adoption of a new corporations act was intended to restrict courts'
statutory power to grant some forms of alternative relief).
In comparison, courts in the following states have found that equitable remedies not
specifically authorized by statute may be appropriate: Alabama (Belcher v. Birmingham Trust
Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 148 (N.D. Ala. 1968)), Alaska (Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d
443, 446 (Alaska 1985)), Iowa (Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984)),
Montana (Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 238 (Mont. 1983)), New Jersey (Brenner v.
Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1031 (N.J. 1993)), New Mexico (McCauley v. Tom McCauley &
Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 243 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)), New York (In Re Wiedy's Furniture
Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (App. Div. 1985)), North Dakota (Balvik v.
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388-89 (N.D. 1987)), Oregon (Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
564 P.2d 277, 288 (Or. 1977)), Pennsylvania (Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1560
(W.D. Pa. 1984)), and Texas (Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)).
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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when a lesser remedy is more appropriate, has been a popular alternative to
dissolution.
IV. VALUATION METHODS AND

DISCOUNTS

A. Valuation Rules
1. Chapter 14, Business CorporationsAct
If the court grants the plaintiff shareholder a buyout, what method will the
court employ in valuing the plaintiff's shares? South Carolina law does not
provide a clear answer to this question. Section 33-14-310 states that the court
may order the purchase of the plaintiffs shares at their "fair value " " but
provides no further guidance in determining fair value.'
Only two South Carolina dissolution cases address the problem of valuing
shares in the context of a forced buyout. Neither case establishes a clear
valuation rule. The first case, Segall v. Shore,"' involved two officershareholders who misappropriated money from the corporation for their
personal use."12 The remaining shareholders brought an action seeking
dissolution or, in the alternative, a forced purchase of their shares.1 3 The
court upheld the master's finding that the defendants had acted oppressively
and unfairly and determined that a buyout was appropriate. The court,
however, disagreed with the trial judge's use of a "liquidation appraisal." In
determining the liquidation value of the plaintiffs stock, the trial judge
deducted from the stock's value an amount equal to the tax liability that would
be incurred if the corporation were liquidated. The court stated that there was
"no reason to presuppose the liquidation of [the company]" and that the
judge's ruling had subjected the plaintiffs to a tax that might never arise in
reality." 4 Instead, the court indicated that the corporation should be valued
as a going concern and that, consequently, no deduction should be made for
5
tax liability that would arise upon liquidation. "

109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
110. Nor is the term "fair value" defined elsewhere in the chapter covering dissolution
(Chapter 14). Nevertheless, fair value is defined in the dissenter's rights chapter (Chapter 13)
at § 33-13-101(3). Although the definitions listed in § 33-13-101 technically apply only to the
sections in Chapter 13, it is likely that the definition of fair value would be applied in dissolution
cases as well. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
111. 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316 (1977).
112. Id. at 36-37, 236 S.E.2d at 318.
113. Segall v. Shore, 264 S.C. 442, 445, 215 S.E.2d 895, 902 (1975) (per curiam) (earlier
opinion).
114. Segall, 269 S.C. at 37, 236 S.E.2d at 318.
115. Id. The court noted that it had "discussed the appraisal of stock at length" in Santee Oil
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The second dissolution case addressing the valuation of stock is a federal
district court case, Hendley v. Lee." 6 In that case, the shareholders became
deadlocked because of disagreements regarding the management of the company." 7 The parties brought an action seeking to have the dispute resolved.
Initially, both the plaintiffs and the defendant sought to purchase the other
parties' shares, but later each party sought to sell their own shares. Ultimately, the plaintiffs asked the court for an equitable division of the company,
which would have essentially allowed the corporation to continue operating,
but in two parts. However, the court determined that a buyout was appropriate and that the plaintiffs were better suited to make the purchase." 8
The court then turned to the question of valuing the defendant's shares.
As a preliminary matter, the court stated that the value of the shares should be
determined as of the time of the trial; the court noted, however, that "[i]n
cases of minority stockholder oppression, the date of ouster seems appropriately used."119 In determining the value of the corporation, both parties'
experts employed a capitalization of earnings approach, in which the

corporation's "adjusted pretax income" for the most current fiscal year was
multiplied by an "earnings multiplier." 20 The adjusted pretax income was
determined by adding the amount of "non-functional" compensation paid to the

company's officers to the pretax income.' 2' The earnings multiplier that the

Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975), a dissenter's rights case. Id. This comment
suggests that the valuation principles applied in dissenter's rights cases would be equally
applicable in dissolution cases.
116. 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
117. Deadlock among the shareholders or directors is another ground for judicial dissolution.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(i) (Law. Co-op. 1990); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21150(a)(1)-(2) (1976) (earlier version of statute applied in Hendley). Hendley did not involve any
allegations of oppression on the part of either party.
118. Hendley, 676 F. Supp. at 1327. The court considered a number of factors in determining
which party should be forced to purchase the other party's shares. For example, the court found
it important that the plaintiffs were financially better able to purchase the shares, that no undue
hardship would be imposed on the plaintiffs by requiring the purchase, that the defendant was
capable of adapting to another vocation, and that the defendant would have a smaller tax liability
from selling than would the plaintiffs. Id. at 1325-27. The court's analysis illustrates that, under
the judicial dissolution statute, either party to the action may be required to purchase the other
party's shares; the defendant will not always be required to make the purchase.
119. Id. at 1327. The court recognized that "there is little case authority setting the proper
date of valuing a company in a buyout situation." Id. It appears that the court used the date of
trial because there were no significant events in the facts of the case, such as the ouster of an
oppressed shareholder, from which the date could be set. Even in an oppression case, however,
it could be difficult to determine a precise date of ouster, as oppression often occurs
incrementally. Thus, the date of trial may be used as a default date for valuation purposes if no
single significant date can be determined.
120. Id.
121. Nonfunctional compensation means that part of an officer's salary which is not intended
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court accepted (4.48) was calculated by dividing the value of the company in
1984 by the company's adjusted pretax income in that year." The primary
debate between the parties' experts concerned the amount of nonfunctional
compensation that had been paid by the company in the most recent fiscal
year. After resolving this question, the court calculated the company's value
by adding the pretax income and non-functional compensation, and then
multiplying this sum by the earnings multiplier."
Aside from Segall and Hendley, no other South Carolina cases brought
pursuant to the judicial dissolution statutes give further explanation as to the
means of valuing stock in a forced buyout setting. This dearth of dissolution
cases raises the question of whether South Carolina courts would apply the
same valuation principles in a dissolution proceeding as in a dissenter's rights
proceeding. The Segall opinion suggests that the same valuation methods
should be applied in both types of cases, in that the court cites Santee Oil Co.
v. Cox,"' a dissenter's rights case, in its discussion of the appraisal of
stock. 12S
Several courts from other jurisdictions have found that the nature of the
proceeding, whether dissolution or dissenter's rights, does not affect the
valuation analysis. In Columbia Management Co. v. Wyss, 26 a dissenter's
rights action, the Oregon Court of Appeals relied on a number of dissolution
cases in holding that a minority discount should not have been applied. The
court stated that the slightly different context did not change the analysis
because the statutory standard ("fair value") was the same for both. 7 A

to compensate for services performed for the company, but which is better characterized as a
distribution of profits. Id.
122. The court found it significant that the 1984 valuation of the company had been determined
and agreed upon by the shareholders themselves, and at a time when they were "still on amicable
terms." Id. at 1329.
123. Hendley, 676 F. Supp. at 1329. The court also added to adjusted pretax income a 2
percent allowance for growth of the company during the current year. The calculations were as
follows:
203,971.00 - pretax income for most recent fiscal year
+ 4079.42 - 2% allowance for 1987 growth
+ 93,813.00 - non-functional income paid to Dick Hendley
+ 75,000.00 - non-functional income paid to Terry Lee
376,863.42
x
4.48 - earnings multiplier
$1,688,348.12
Id. The defendant held a one-half interest in the company. Id. at 1327.
124. 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
125. Segall v. Shore, 269 S.C. 31, 37, 236 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1977). However, the valuation
rule set forth in Santee Oil has been superseded by a 1988 amendment to the dissenter's rights
statutes. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
126. 765 P.2d 207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 771 P.2d 1021 (Or. 1989).
127. Id. at 213 n.8.
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New York court, in Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc.,1 commented that courts
should look to appraisal rights cases for guidance in valuing stock in
dissolution proceedings. 29 Likewise, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, in
Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc.,3' stated that "this court's rationale
in [two earlier cases] regarding the determination of 'fair value' in dissenter's
rights cases also applies to the determination of 'fair value' in buy-out
situations under [the judicial dissolution statute]."'
In Charland v.
32 however, the Rhode Island
Country View Golf Club, Inc.,"'
Supreme Court
stated that determining the fair value of shares in a dissenter's rights
proceeding and in a dissolution proceeding were separate issues. 3 Despite
this holding, most courts have applied the statutory standard of fair value in
both types of proceedings. Moreover, the fact that the fair value standard is
used in both the South Carolina dissenter's rights and judicial dissolution
statutes is further indication that the valuation rules from dissenter's rights
cases may be applied in dissolution cases. 134
Prior to a statutory amendment in 1988 which provided an express
definition of fair value,'35 several South Carolina dissenter's rights cases had
established a relatively straightforward procedure for valuing stock. In Santee
Oil Co. v. Cox 3 ' a corporation brought an action to determine the fair value
of stock belonging to a shareholder who had dissented to a merger transaction
involving the corporation. Thecourt noted that no prior South Carolina cases
had effectively construed the meaning of fair value, but that the Delaware
courts "have had fairly frequent occasion to define and apply such term under
corporation law similar to ours."' 37 Citing several cases from Delaware, the
court stated that the fair value standard does not limit an appraising court to
using any single valuation method. 3 ' The court continued:

128. 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1985).
129. Id. at 347.
130. 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
131. Id. at 838.
132. 588 A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991).
133. Id. at 611 n.5.
134. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-250 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (dissenter's rights); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-14-310(d)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (buyout provision in dissolution statute).
135. Fair value had not been defined under the previous dissenter's rights statutes. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-11-270 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (repealed 1989). Section 33-13-101(3) currently
provides in part that "[tihe value of the shares is to be determined by techniques that are accepted
generally in the financial community." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101(3) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
This standard is much more flexible than the rule established by prior case law. See, e.g., Sanitee
Oil Co. v. Cox, 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
136. 265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
137. Id. at 273, 217 S.E.2d at 791.
138. Id. (citing Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. 1965) and
Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 457 (Del. Ch. 1934)).
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Under the weight of authority the three major factors to be considered are:
(1) net asset value; (2) market value; and (3) the earnings or investment
value of the dissenting stock. There are, of course, sub-factors involved
in each of the major factors .... [including] [t]he nature of the enterprise,
i.e., a regulated closed-end investment company; leverage; discount; net
asset value; market value; management; earnings and dividends; expenses
of operation; particular stockholdings in . . .portfolio; and . . .tax
situation.

139

The court further stated that "[a]fter these various factors have been considered and determined in a given case they should then be weighed as to their
relative bearing upon the ultimate question of the fair value of the dissenting
stock."140
The court proceeded to determine the value of the corporation under each
of the three enumerated factors. The court took the average of several
appraisals of the net asset value of the corporation to determine the value of
this factor. To find the corporation's market value, the court used the price
a willing buyer had paid for ten percent of the corporation's stock nine months
prior to the merger. To determine the earnings value, the court multiplied the
company's average earnings for the previous three years by a multiplier (or
price-earnings ratio) of twelve; the court determined that twelve was the
appropriate multiplier because it had been a figure commonly used in the sale
of other oil stocks during the period."
The court did not give a detailed
analysis of the weights that should be assigned to each factor, but simply noted
that while "greater weight should be given to the net asset value factor than
any other factor, .

.

.the other factors have a real impact upon what in truth

was the fair value of appellant's shares of stock."142 The court held that it
was error for the trial court only to consider asset value, but found that the

139. Id. at 274, 217 S.E.2d at 791-92 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71,
73 (Del. Ch. 1950)).
140. Id. at 274, 217 S.E.2d at 792 (citing Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n, 213 A.2d
203, 211 (Del. 1965) and Francis I. Du Pont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d
344, 346, 352 (Del. Ch. 1973), aff'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975)).
141. Santee Oil, 265 S.C. at 275-77, 217 S.E.2d at 792-93.
142. Id. at 276, 217 S.E.2d at 793. Merely for the purpose of showing that the trial
court's valuation was not against the clear weight of the evidence, the court calculated the
company's value as follows:
Net asset value
Market value
Capitalized earnings
Total value of corporation stock
Id. at 277, 217 S.E.2d at 793.
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931,603 x 15% =
644,976 x 15% =

$785,866.00
139,740.00
96,746.0
$1,022,352.00
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trial court's ultimate determination of value was not against the clear weight
of the evidence.' 43
The valuation method developed in Santee Oil for dissenter's rights cases
was replaced in 1988 by the statutory definition of fair value found in section
33-13-101(3). This section provides:
"Fair value," with respect to a dissenter's shares, means the value of the
shares immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which
the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in
anticipation of the corporate action to which the dissenter objects,
excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate
action unless exclusion would be inequitable. The value of the shares is
to be determined by techniques that are accepted generally in the financial
44
community.
The definition was taken directly from the Model Act, except that the last
sentence was added to make clear that the Delaware Block (i.e., Santee Oil)
method would no longer be controlling. The South Carolina Reporters'
Comments suggest that the Delaware Block method was discarded because it
artificially produces "values lower than those that would be used in a
voluntary sale of the shares. ""' The end result is that the current definition
provides a much less restrictive method for determining fair value by simply
directing that the valuation methods used in the financial community be
followed. 1'

143. Id. at 275, 217 S.E.2d at 792. In Santee Oil, therefore, the South Carolina Supreme
Court endorsed the use of the "Delaware Block" valuation method for valuing stock in a
dissenter's rights case. Under the Delaware Block method, the market, asset, and earnings values
of a corporation's stock are determined. A percentage weight is then assigned to each of the
three values, depending on the type of business involved, its objectives, and so on. The sum of
these three calculations gives the total value of the corporation's stock. Two later dissenter's
rights cases, Metromont Materials Corp. v. Pennell, 270 S.C. 9, 239 S.E.2d 753 (1977), and
Dibble v. Sumter Ice & Fuel Co., 283 S.C. 278, 322 S.E.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1984), provided
further instruction on the appropriate weights to be assigned each of the component calculations
in the Delaware Block method.
As noted elsewhere, the Delaware Block method has been superseded by the statutory
definition of fair value enacted in 1988. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101(3)& reporters' cmts.
(Law. Co-op. 1990).
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101(3) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-101(3) reporters' cmts. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
146. The South Carolina Reporters' Comments explain that this language was taken from a
Delaware case, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en banc). Id. The
Weinberger court held that the Delaware Block method would "no longer exclusively control"
in stock valuation cases. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. In its place, the court adopted a "more
liberal approach" which would permit "proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community." Id. at 713.
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Although the definitions in section 33-13-101 expressly apply only to
dissenter's rights cases, it seems likely that the definition of fair value
described above would also be used in dissolution cases. First, the statutory
standard (fair value) is the same for both types of valuations; thus, in looking
for a definition of fair value in a dissolution case, a court might logically turn
to the dissenter's rights definition. Moreover, in Segall v. Shore,147 a
dissolution case, the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed to Santee Oil Co.
v. Cox,14 8 a dissenter's rights case, for a discussion of stock appraisal
(although both cases were decided before the 1988 statutory amendments).
Lastly, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 1 the case from which the definition
of fair value in section 33-13-101(3) is taken, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that the new, liberal approach to stock valuation is appropriate in
"appraisal [dissenter's rights] and other stock valuation cases,"5' which
would presumably include dissolution cases.
2. Chapter18, Business CorporationsAct
(Statutory Close CorporationSupplement)
The buyout provisions in the Statutory Close Corporation Supplement give
additional instruction concerning how to determine the fair value of stock.
Section 33-18-420(b)(1) provides:
(b) If the court orders a share purchase, it shall: (1) determine the fair
value of the shares, considering among other relevant evidence the going
concern value of the corporation, any agreement among some or all of the
shareholders fixing the price or specifying a formula for determining share
value for any purpose, the recommendations of any appraisers appointed
by the court, and any legal constraints on the corporation's ability to
purchase the shares.'
This approach to valuation, though still somewhat open-ended, provides more
direction than the "financial community" standard of the dissenter's rights
statute. Nonetheless, the Official Comment to this section states that "[flair
value is to be determined under principles developed in dissenters' rights and
other valuation cases."' 5 2 Therefore, in cases involving statutory close
corporations, South Carolina courts should regard the financial community

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

269 S.C. 31, 37, 236 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1977).
265 S.C. 270, 217 S.E.2d 789 (1975).
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en bane).
Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-420(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-420 cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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standard as a broad outline within which they can use the sources noted in
section 33-18-420(b)(1) to fill in the details. 3
3. Chapter 43, Limited Liability Company Act
Section 33-43-602(A) of the Limited Liability Company (LLC) Act
provides that dissociating members are entitled to the fair value of their
interest, but only if the operating agreement does not establish the amount of
the distribution to be made. 54 Section 33-43-602(B) defines fair value as
"the amount that would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell, and with knowledge of all relevant
facts.""'s This is, of course, the classic formulation of fair market value.
The definition is peculiar because the term used by the section is fair value,
not fair market value. 156 Ribstein and Keatinge suggest that courts should
evaluate the LLC's going concern value, as opposed to its book value, when
determining the value of the dissociating member's interest., 7
B. Discounts
In the context of valuation proceedings, the issue oftbn arises as to
whether certain discounts should be applied to the value of the stock in
question. These discounts result in a reduction in the stock's value and arise
due to certain negative qualities of the stock. For example, stock in a close
corporation is generally held to be less valuable than comparable stock in a
public corporation because there typically is not a ready market for closely
held stock; publicly traded stock has much greater liquidity. The rule on the
applicability of these discounts varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
1. Key Man Discount
The key man discount is the only type of discount that has been directly
considered in South Carolina. A key man discount simply involves a

153. For example, the court in Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1327-28 (D.S.C. 1987),
determined the earnings value of the corporation on the basis of a prior agreement between the
shareholders concerning the value of the corporation. Section 33-18-420(b)(1) provides that
shareholder agreements may be used in the valuation process.
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-602(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
155. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-602(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
156. In fact, the use of the term fair value instead of fair market value has been put forth as
a reason for rejecting the applicationofa minority discount to a member's interest, See RIBSTEIN
& KEATINGE, supra note 80, at 11-8, and the discussion concerning minority discounts, infra part
IV.B.2.
157. RmsrEIN & KEATiNGE, supra note 80, at 11-8.
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reduction in the value of stock when the transaction involves the departure of
a significant executive, or "key man," from the company. In Hendley v.
Lee, 58 discussed above, the court ordered the plaintiffs to purchase the
defendant's one-half interest in the corporation. After determining the value
of the corporation, the court noted that its calculations assumed there would
be no "slippage" in the corporation's earnings after the defendant had been
bought out. The court acknowledged, however, that the defendant had been
a key man in the corporation in that he had been primarily responsible for its
management. 159 Because the defendant's departure presumably would be
detrimental to the company's profitability, the plaintiffs argued that the value
of the defendant's stock should be reduced to account for a key man
discount. ,60
Ultimately, the court found that a key man discount was inappropriate
under the facts of the case. The key man discount normally applied "in cases
where the executive has already left the company and the company is unable
to find a suitable replacement. "16' The court pointed out that the defendant
was still employed with the company, and that even if he left, the plaintiffs
would be able to effectively manage the company themselves. Although the
plaintiffs had stated that they would not continue to employ the defendant,
under the court's order they had the opportunity to retain the defendant
through any transition period. The court thus concluded that it would be
unfair to discount the defendant's stock on the basis of an event "which is
62
speculative and which, at any rate, is under the control of the plaintiffs."
The court opined that discounts are properly applied in the context of a
"willing buyer/willing seller" transaction. However, discounts should not be
applied when the transaction involves a court-ordered sale between insiders.
Because the purchasers in this case were insiders, they already had the benefit
of an established presence in the industry and would likely be able to recover
from any temporary slippage in profitability. The court further observed that
any discount in the value of the defendant's stock would be offset by the fact
that the plaintiffs would have a controlling interest in the corporation after the
purchase (when they previously controlled only fifty percent).' 63
Hendley thus leaves open the possibility that key man discounts or other
discounts might be appropriate in certain factual settings. However, the broad
statement made by the court that discounts should not be applied in forced sale

158. 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
159. Id. at 1330.
160. Id. at 1329-30.
161. Id. at 1330 (citing Harry J.Haynsworth, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L.
REV. 457 (1982)).
162. Id. at 1330-31.
163. Hendley, 676 F. Supp. at 1330.
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transactions between insiders lends support to the argument that discounts are
never appropriate in oppression cases.
2. Minority andMarketability Discounts
Questions concerning the applicability of minority and marketability
discounts often arise in the context of oppression cases. A minority discount
is sometimes applied to stock that represents a noncontrolling interest in a
corporation because the purchaser of such stock does not acquire the power to
control the corporation. A marketability discount, briefly described above, is
applied to stock in a closely held corporation because such stock often has no
ready market and is subject to transfer restrictions.
South Carolina courts have not discussed the applicability of these
discounts in dissolution or dissenter's rights cases. Most courts from other
jurisdictions that have considered the issue have determined that minority
discounts should not be applied to minority shares that a corporation elects or
is compelled to purchase in the context of a dissolution proceeding. However,
a few of these courts have held that marketability discounts may be appropri1
ate. 64
The rationale for rejecting the minority discount in the dissolution setting
is that the minority shareholder would receive her full, pro rata share of the
corporation's net assets if dissolution were ordered instead of a buyout.
Moreover, when a party already in control of the corporation purchases
minority shares, as occurs in a court-ordered buyout, it is irrelevant that the
shares represent a noncontrolling interest; minority shares are not worth less
to the majority because the majority already possesses the power to control the
corporation. In jurisdictions where the dissolution statute permits the majority
shareholders to elect a buyout as an alternative to dissolution, the courts
sometimes point out that the majority should not be allowed the benefit of a
discount by making such an election. ,61
Several courts from other jurisdictions have considered the applicability
of discounts in the context of dissolution proceedings. In Raskin v. Walter
Karl, Inc.' 6 the court distinguished between minority discounts and marketability discounts, holding that only the latter was appropriate in a dissolution
proceeding in which the corporation had elected to buy out the minority
shareholder. The trial court had refused to apply a discount in determining the
value of the plaintiff's shares. In reaching its decision, the trial court relied

164. See Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Proprietyof Applying MinorityDiscount to Value of
SharesPurchasedby Corporationor its ShareholdersfromMinority Shareholders,13 A.L.R.5TH
840 (1993).
165. Id. at 850.
166. 514 N.Y.S.2d 120 (App. Div. 1987) (mem.).
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on a line of cases which held that minority discounts were improper in a
forced buyout setting. On appeal, the court agreed that a minority discount
should not be applied because "[t]o do so would defeat the purpose of the
[dissolution statute] to protect a minority shareholder from any unjust exercise
by the majority shareholders of their greater power." 67 The court continued, "However, a discount for lack of marketability accurately reflects the
lesser value of shares that cannot be freely traded, whether they be a minority
or a majority of the shares, and as such is an appropriate adjustment. "168
Finding that the defendants' proposed discount of thirty-five percent was
excessive because it was partly based on a minority discount, the court
concluded that a69discount of not greater than ten percent was proper under the
circumstances. 1
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Charland v. Country View Golf
Club, Inc.,170 held that neither a minority nor a marketability discount should
apply when a corporation elects to buy out a shareholder who has petitioned
for dissolution. The court separately discussed the reasons for not applying
either discount. Concerning minority discounts, the court noted that few
jurisdictions have addressed the issue, but that most of those that had
addressed it determined that minority discounts were inappropriate in this
setting. 171 The court discussed the case Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box
Co. 172as a leading case on the issue of minority discounts. The Brown court
cited several reasons for rejecting minority discounts: the non-controlling
status of minority shares is insignificant when the corporation, instead of a
third party, purchases the shares; the plaintiffs had proven their case for
dissolution and would have been entitled to the pro rata value of their shares
had the corporation not elected to purchase the shares; and, moreover, it
would be unfair to allow the majority to use oppressive conduct to incite a
petition for dissolution and then purchase the minority's shares at a discount. 173 The Charlandcourt agreed with this rationale and adopted the rule
that minority discounts do not apply when a corporation elects to buy out a
shareholder's stock pursuant to the dissolution statute. 174
The Charlandcourt next addressed the issue of marketability discounts,
noting that courts were divided on this question. Citing Brown, the court
observed that California courts had rejected marketability discounts because,
as in the context of a minority discount, the shares are being sold to the
167. Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 588 A.2d 609 (R.I. 1991).
171. Id. at 611.
172. 154 Cal. Rptr. 170 (Ct. App. 1979).
173. Id. at 176.
174. Charland,588 A.2d at 612.
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corporation and not on the open market where the discount would legitimately
apply."
New York courts, however, had determined that marketability
discounts should apply because the shares of a close corporation cannot readily
be sold on the public market. 176 The Charlandcourt found that the difference in the two approaches arose partly from the difference in the states'
statutes. The California statute provided that the fair value of the minority's
shares should be based on the liquidation value of the corporation, while the
New York statute simply provided that the minority shareholder should be paid
a fair value for his shares. 1
The court, in holding that the marketability discount should not apply,
distinguished its Rhode Island statute from the similar provisions of the New
York statute."I The court further stated, however, that it would reject the
marketability discount even if there were no discrepancies between the Rhode
Island and New York statutes. A minority shareholder seeking dissolution
must show that the majority has engaged in some form of unfair conduct. The
court concluded that it would be unfair for a shareholder who has proven a
case for dissolution to have the value of his shares discounted for the purposes
of an elected buyout, when the shareholder would have received full value
under a dissolution of the corporation. 79 Arguably, this rationale would not
apply in a case in which the court awarded a buyout as a less drastic remedy
because the facts were not strong enough to warrant dissolution.
In Chiles v. Robertson8t the court held that the trial court had properly
refused to apply either minority or marketability discounts. The court
commented:
This is not a sale by a willing seller to a willing buyer, and defendants
should not benefit from reductions in value that are based on such a sale.

We require defendants to purchase plaintiffs' interests because of their
breach of duty to plaintiffs. The purchase is a judicial remedy to
compensate plaintiffs for the damage resulting from defendants' wrongs,
not a market transaction.' 8'

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 613. The Rhode Island statute provided that fair value would be determined from
the day the petition for dissolution was filed, while the New York statute provided that fair value
would be determined from the day before the petition was filed. Id.
179. Charland, 588 A.2d at 613.
180. 767 P.2d 903 (Or. Ct. App.), nodified, 774 P.2d 500 (Or. Ct. App.), and review denied,
784 P.2d 1099 (Or. 1989).
181. Id. at 926 (citation omitted).
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The court also recognized that if the discounts were applied the plaintiffs
would receive less than if the corporation were dissolved, a result the court
felt would not be appropriate "in light of our finding of defendants' oppressive
conduct. "18
In McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc. ' 3 the court held that the
use of discounts in determining fair value was within the trial court's
discretion and thus upheld the application of a minority discount. ' 4 The
plaintiff contended that if the trial court had ordered dissolution, she would
have received the full value of her shares. She also argued that the defendants
should not be allowed to benefit from their oppressive conduct by obtaining
such a discount. The court rejected the plaintiffs arguments, stating that the
trial court had discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy and in finding a
"fair and reasonable" price for the plaintiffs shares.' 85 The court noted that
the noncontrolling nature of minority shares diminishes their value and found
that there was sufficient evidence to support the application of a minority
discount in this case. 186
Other cases have also addressed the issue of how to determine the value
of minority shares under involuntary dissolution statutes, including In re Pace
Photographers,Ltd.,87 in which the court stated,
Value "should be determined on the basis of what a willing purchaser, in
an arm's length transaction, would offer for the corporation as an
operating business, rather than as a business in the process of liquidation."
In reaching such a determination, the court obviously may take into
account the shareholders' agreement provisions regarding value,
efforts to sell the
petitioner's own offer to buy, the corporation's alleged
88
business earlier, and any other pertinent evidence.1
C. Summary and Application
If the court orders the majority shareholders or the corporation to
purchase Maddox's interest, the court will probably employ the definition of

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 244.

187. 525 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1988).
188. Id. at 718-19 (citations omitted); see also Hughes v. Sego Int'l Ltd., 469 A.2d 74, 79
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (stating that trial court "could make adjustments to the fair
value to reflect the equities of the case and in so doing could appropriately consider the
shareholders' agreement."); In re Joy Wholesale Sundries, Inc., 508 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (App.
Div. 1986) (mem.) (holding that marketability discount of 10% should have been applied by trial
court).
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fair value set forth in section 33-13-101(3) to determine the fair value of
Maddox's interest.
Although the definition expressly applies only to
dissenter's fights cases, it is likely that it would also be employed in the
context of a court-ordered buyout.
After the value of Maddox's stock has been calculated, the majority
shareholders may claim that certain discounts should be applied to reduce the
final value of the stock. The court would reject the application of a key man
discount because the corporation voluntarily terminated Maddox's employment
with the company and thus would not be able to contend that Maddox's
departure damaged the company. The court might consider the applicability
of a minority or marketability discount, although the language from one
federal district court case' suggests that no discounts would be appropriate
in the context of a court-ordered buyout.
V. CONCLUSION

Under the South Carolina judicial dissolution statute, a court has great
flexibility in awarding relief to minority shareholders who claim oppression by
control persons. The comments instruct the court not to intervene in
legitimate power struggles within the corporation." 9° When, however, the
conduct of the persons in control of the corporation rises to the level of
oppression, the court is authorized to order dissolution, a buyout, or a number
of other less drastic remedies. The oppression standard is an important aspect
of the statute because it allows the court to grant relief based on conduct which
is less egregious than illegality or fraud. The judicial dissolution statute thus
grants the court a large, but appropriate, amount of discretion in reaching the
proper balance between the interests of controlling and minority shareholders.

189. Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317 (D.S.C. 1987).
190. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(a) cmt. (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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